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Abstract—There is a general consensus that contemporary
electronics are at risk of cyber-attacks or malicious modifications,
such as Hardware Trojans (HT). This makes it crucial to develop
reliable countermeasures at both Integrated Circuit (IC) and
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) levels. While HT detection at IC
level has been widely studied in the past several years, there is
still very limited research carried out to tackle HTs on PCBs. We
propose a power analysis method for detecting HT components
implanted on PCBs. An experimental setup, using a hardware
prototype, is built and tested for verification of the methodology,
taking process and temperature variations into account. The
results confirm the ability to detect alien components on a PCB
and provide directions for further research. The performance
degradation of the original PCB due to the implementation of
the proposed approach is negligible. The area overhead of the
proposed method is small, related to the original PCB design, and
consists of Sub Power Monitors of individual ICs on the PCB
and Main Power Monitor for the overall power measurement of
the PCB. To the best of our knowledge this research is the first to
develop a PCB HT detection methodology using power analysis.
Index Terms—Hardware Trojan (HT), Printed Circuit Board
(PCB), Power Monitoring, Trusted Manufacturing, Hardware
Tampering Attacks and Protection, Hardware Prototype, Process
Variation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of outsourcing of hardware fabrication to third par-
ties in recent years has dramatically increased the possibility
of malicious activities and consequently the security risk for
systems incorporating the hardware. The harm to the system
can be caused by destructive alterations and spy inclusions
referred to as Hardware Trojans (HTs) [1], [2]. The HT is a
rogue piece of hardware that is secretly deployed for a number
of reasons, including information gathering, false signalling
and control etc. Trojans can be inserted into an integrated
circuit (IC) [3] or on a printed circuit board (PCB) and get
control over data communication between, for example, the
processor and the external components [4], [5].
The destructive activities of HTs can cause catastrophic
consequences including paralysing major financial or military
systems, shortening operational lifetime of the hardware or
complete failure of the system [6]. HTs on a PCB or IC can
give an attacker unauthorized access into the hardware and
initiate a leakage or corruption of important information [7].
Hardware Trojans have become a serious problem in the
last 10-12 years. There has been a dramatic increase in the
number of publications since the original paper by Agrawal et
al. in 2007 [10], where a novel side-channel based approach
was proposed for detecting the presence of HT circuitry in
ICs. Since then, research has been mostly focused on HT
design, detection and prevention at IC level of abstraction
[11]. The difficulty of detecting a Trojan is determined by its
trigger and payload mechanism. Therefore significant research
has been carried out on IC HT design and evaluation of new
triggers and payloads [12]–[17]. Much more research however
has been carried out on developing methodologies for IC HT
countermeasures, which can be broadly classified as detection
[8], [10], [18]–[20] and prevention [21]–[28] methods.
Malicious HT attacks have also been reported at higher
levels of system abstraction such as PCBs, which are becoming
increasingly exposed and vulnerable to unwanted modifica-
tions during design or fabrication in untrusted facilities [29]–
[31]. Providing mechanical support for the electrical inter-
connections between different blocks, PCBs are an organic
part of every electronic system. Modern complex and highly
integrated designs may contain up to thirty layers with con-
cealed micro-vias and embedded passive components [32]. An
attacker can aim to modify the PCB design by tampering the
interconnections or inserting extra components in an internal
layer of a multi-layer board [7]. Like its IC counterpart,
a PCB HT can serve two purposes, causing system failure
or leaking secret information. A serious alarm on Hardware
Trojan attacks on PCBs was raised by Bloomberg in 2018 [33],
which reported on a very large-scale infiltration attempt into
secret servers using a tiny malicious chip. The article alleged
that the tampering attack on Super Micro servers affected
around 30 companies, including US government contractors, a
major bank, and other valuable companies. Although the Super
Micro Computer company denied that malicious hardware chip
has been implanted during the manufacturing process [34], it
was demonstrated later [35] that such an attack is actually
possible and feasible. Therefore developing countermeasures
for HT detection on PCBs has become crucial [36]. This
problem is addressed in the paper.
Prior Work: Very little research has been published
concerned with countermeasures for PCB HTs. Amongst them
[37] is concerned with an encryption and obfuscation based
protection against HT risks on PCBs. This method requires
the communicating chips to be equipped with encrypting and
decrypting capabilities. Non-destructive board-level reverse
engineering by x-ray imaging of a PCB is presented in [38].
This method, which allows extraction of all information re-
quired to reproduce the PCB, can be used to develop advanced
countermeasures for PCB HTs. The rest of existing publica-
tions have been mainly concerned with security issues and
post-fabrication tampering attacks [2], [29]. Since conventional
PCB test methodologies often fail to detect PCB HTs [33],
the importance of the problem and the gap in research make
it crucial to investigate new countermeasures for detecting and
preventing them.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the descrip-
tion of the attacker model in Section II is followed by the
proposed approach in Section III. Then Section IV is devoted
to the proposed methodology. Further, Section V describes the
experimental setup with the results discussed in Section VI.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. ATTACKER MODEL
An HT implanted on the PCB can have different power
sources, including: (a) a built in energy harvester/battery, (b)
the mains supply, (c) the power distribution network (PDN)
of the PCB and (d) an I/O pin of a legitimate chip. In case
(a), a visual inspection of the board can lead to detection of
the HT, since an energy harvester or a battery are typically
large in size and hard to conceal. In order to connect to the
mains power supply, the HT should have external vias which
are visible, hence case (b) can also be detected through image
processing and comparison with a golden model [38]. Of these
cases, (c) and (d) are the stealthiest, since the HT can be fully
operational, while all the modifications to the original design
can be hidden in the internal PCB layers. In these cases an HT
can escape detection through visual inspection, and research
for alternative approaches is necessary.
In this attacker model it is assumed that the adversary can
use any HT irrespective of its payload and trigger, as long
as the malicious device consumes additional power. It is also
assumed that the power to the PCB power distribution network
goes only through the dedicated Main Power Monitor (MPM).
Further, the IC and PCB design houses, as well as the firmware
and intellectual properties used to design the ICs are trusted.
The threat rises from outsourcing PCB production to overseas
facilities, as well as from the possibility of interception while
the device is in transit from the manufacturer to the consumer.
It is possible for the adversary to swap a trusted IC on
the PCB with an HT infected and counterfeit (recycled,
remarked) ICs, but this attack case is out of the scope of
this paper. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there
is a considerable amount of existing research aimed at design,
detection and prevention of IC HTs and counterfeits [39]–[44],
which can be utilised to tackle the threat of swapping ICs.
III. OUR APPROACH
In this work, a Differential Power Monitoring (DPM) ap-
proach is proposed to detect Hardware Trojans on the PCB
powered from the PDN. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work on PCB HT detection using power monitoring.
The approach is applied during in-field operation, as a run-time
monitoring technique. Additionally, previous works can be
used as complementary techniques (e.g. encrypting-decrypting
communication between legitimate ICs [37]). Hardware Tro-
jans are detected by measuring dynamic power due to HT
circuit switching and static power due to HT leakage current.
Continuous measurement of power consumption provides in-
formation on the PCB’s internal activities and HT activation.
It is assumed that the PCBs are not defective, therefore the
source of any diversion from the expected power consumption
patterns is assumed an HT.
The main characteristics of the proposed approach are:
1) Independent of the type of Trojan: Any HT that
consumes power higher than the pre-programmed Detection
Threshold will be detected.
2) In-field, online monitoring: This approach constantly
monitors fluctuations in the power consumption of the PCB.
It allows for in-field measurements and online monitoring.
3) High accuracy: False positive rate (FPR) can be reduced
to virtually zero, depending on desired Detection Threshold.
4) Tolerance to Process and Temperature variations.
5) No interruption or performance overheads to the
original performance of the circuit under monitoring: The
approach continuously monitors the PCB without interrupting
the performance or affecting its throughput.
A similar approach for IC HT detection has been applied in
[14] where the aim was HT detection prior to in-field use of
the device. A current sensing resistor and an oscilloscope have
been used to manually compute power consumption and detect
the HT inside an FPGA. In our research a PCB integrated run-
time HT detection framework has been implemented, where
every legitimate IC has a dedicated digital power sensor.
Current integration method for detecting HTs inside ICs has
also been suggested in [3] where the current consumption has
been computed with a local sensor inside an IC. Using the
current integration method, the data has subsequently been
processed to detect HT induced anomalies. In our method, the
difference between the readings from a global power consump-
tion sensor and the sum of local power consumption sensors
has been computed. This allows us to detect a Hardware Trojan
implanted on the PDN that is located between the power
source of the PCB and the legitimate ICs.
The approach proposed in this paper has been validated
with experimental measurements. The results show that HT
detection can be achieved with a low FPR while keeping
the performance degradation at a negligible level and the
area overhead minimal. Note that the end-users are required
to carry out similar analysis based on their golden model
and specific software workload scenarios. Similar to the case
studies discussed in Section VI, Detection Thresholds can be
decided using general guidelines provided later in this paper.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) Silicon die inside the package, (b) Sub Power
Monitor and the die integrated into one package.
Fig. 2: Block structure of a PCB with the proposed Differen-
tial Power Monitoring system and a Hardware Trojan.
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Regardless of the payload, trigger and the amplitude of the
damage caused, one common feature of additional components
introduced to a circuit is an increase in power consumption.
The proposed DPM method is designed to detect extra power
usage on the board. For a DPM to be feasible, the individual
chips on the PCB should be equipped with power consumption
sensors, henceforth referred to as Sub Power Monitors (SPMs)
(Fig. 1).
The monitoring circuit consists of a main power monitor
(MPM) device on the main power rail, and SPMs integrated
with individual chips on the PCB (Fig. 2). The MPM includes
a power sensor and a microcontroller for the noise dampening
and data communication logic. The dampening logic takes the
moving average of the readings from power sensors, while the
communication logic acts as the device user interface.
As illustrated in Fig. 3a, the resistance of the original circuit
on the PCB is formed by a parallel connection of multiple
legitimate ICs. It can be summed up under one effective
resistance (ROrig). An HT device can be modelled as a
resistive load (RHT ) added in parallel to ROrig (Fig. 3b).
When the HT is non-operational, it consumes little power and
the value of its effective resistance is high. However, when the
HT is triggered, its power consumption increases and this can
be modelled by decreasing the value of RHT .
In the case of an ideal power distribution network (PDN), it
can be assumed that its power dissipation (PPDN ) on parasitic
resistance is zero. If every component on the PCB has an
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Abstraction of the (a) effective resistance of the
original circuit, and (b) PCB with an added Hardware Trojan.
integrated SPM, the mismatch (∆P ) between the reading from
the MPM (PMPM ) and the sum of the readings from SPMs
(
∑n
i=1(PSPM )i) should be zero:PMPM =
n∑
i=1




∆P = PMPM −
n∑
i=1
(PSPM )i = 0. (2)
However, real PDNs will naturally consume some power
due to their non-zero parasitic resistance (PPDN 6= 0). In
addition, to account for the background noise, an extra term δ
should be introduced into (2) and ∆P will be given as follows
∆P = PPDN + δ. (3)
Furthermore, since every device has its dynamic and static
power consumption, adding an HT component to the circuit
will increase ∆P . The final sought after variable is
∆PHTinf = PMPM −
n∑
i=1






where ∆PHTinf is the mismatch between the total power
consumption (PMPM ) and the sum of power consumptions by
individual chips (
∑n
i=1(PSPM )i) on an HT infected PCB. The
HT’s dynamic and static power consumptions are represented
by PDynHT and P
Stat
HT . Assuming the value of PPDN is known
for a given PCB layout, the existence of an inactive HT
(PDynHT = 0) on the PCB can be detected through P
Stat
HT , if
this value is considerably larger than δ (PStatHT >> δ).
On the other hand, it is also possible to detect a trig-
gered HT through continuous monitoring. Once the triggering
mechanism is activated, the internal states of the HT chip
should switch to deliver the malicious payload. This inevitably
introduces a sharp increase in the power consumption of the
extra component represented as dynamic power consumption
PDynHT in (4). In turn, the spike in P
Dyn
HT translates into a spike
in ∆PHTinf values (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4: Change in ∆PHTinf when the HT is triggered.
In order to detect the HT based on increased ∆PHTinf
values, a new parameter is introduced - Detection Threshold
(Fig. 4, Fig. 5). The choice of the Detection Threshold for a
particular PCB is based on a number of parameters includ-
ing maximum acceptable False Positive Rate and minimum
detectable power consumption of the Hardware Trojan. Note
that the Detection Threshold defines the highest value of
∆PHTinf , above which anything is flagged as an active HT
on the board. Its value is pre-programmed in the MPM block,
taking into account the factors mentioned above.
In addition, along with the rise in the value of PMPM ,
another characteristic feature of a triggered HT is the drop
in
∑n






























where Rnew = ROrigRHT /(ROrig +RHT ) and Vin is the
input voltage. The power drop in (5), whose behaviour is
schematically shown in Fig. 5, is due to the increased volt-
age drop on the PDN, after the Hardware Trojan has been
triggered. The dependence of the drop in the combined SPM
power consumption on RHT is shown in Fig. 6 for three values
of RPDN . In this work, we have primarily focused on the
spikes in ∆PHTinf values, which take into account both the
effect of the drop in
∑n
i=1(PSPM )i and the rise in PMPM ,
since ∆PHTinf is the difference between them.
In order to reduce the background noise δ in (3), filtering
by the moving average of every recorded ∆PHTinf with its
previous N−1 values is applied, where N (averaging level) is
the number of averaged points. The resulting values are stored








Detectability trade-off between the HT activation time and
power consumption should be considered since a higher av-
eraging level N will result in a loss of accuracy in detecting
Fig. 5: Change in power consumption pattern when a Hard-
ware Trojan is triggered.
Fig. 6: The effect of RHT on the drop in the registered com-
bined Sub Power Monitor power consumption
∑n
i=1(PSPM )i.
short duration HT payloads, but will allow for detection of
low-power HTs. The application specific optimal value for






where tHT is minimum detectable HT activation time given
as a technical requirement, and ν is the recording frequency
of the monitoring system.
This technique successfully dampens the distortions intro-
duced by the noise δ, as well as anomalies introduced through
sensor error, which would otherwise be interpreted as peaks
induced by an active HT (Section VI).
Detection Range Analysis
The Detection Threshold Pthr can be calculated using the




PSensRes ≤ Pthr ≤ PHT ,
(7)
where N is the averaging level, PPDN is the parasitic power
consumption of the power distribution network, PSensRes is
the power sensor resolution, and PHT is the minimum value
of the HT power consumption that we aim to detect. The
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Fig. 7: Diagram view of the PCB prototype.
coefficient α (α ∈ (0, 1]) can be determined experimentally on
the given setup, once the value of the desired FPR has been
chosen. For example, if it is required to have FPR = 0%,
then α = 1. As for δmax, it represents the maximum value
of the background noise δ, which can be approximated by a
normal distribution with zero mean.
It should be noted that the threshold is determined as a
function of the amplitude of noise, the averaging level, and
the power sensor resolution.
If n is the number of independent DPM outputs fi (i =
1, ..., n), each of which has HT detection probability p, then
fi can be described as a Bernoulli distribution [45] with
fi =
{
0 HT not detected ∆PHTinf < Pthr
1 HT detected ∆PHTinf ≥ Pthr,
(8)
where ∆PHTinf is defined in (4). It follows from (8) that
the HT is detected when ∆PHTinf reaches the HT Detection
Threshold (7). If there is an active HT on a PCB, the maximum
likelihood estimator for detection probability p for Bernoulli







The detection probability (9) is proportional to the observed
DPM outputs resulted in detection of the HT. It can be seen
from (8) that this probability can be increased by decreasing
Pthr, i.e. the detection probability also is a function of the
same parameters as Pthr.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The original, Hardware Trojan free, circuit consists of
four 16MHz ATmega328P microcontrollers which have been
programmed and wired up into four blocks: Authentication
(Auth. 1, Auth. 2), Processing, and Memory (Fig. 7, Fig. 8).
Additionally, an I2C multiplexer, a keyboard and two displays
have been integrated into the setup. The general function of
Fig. 8: Real life photo of the PCB prototype.
the system is secret data transmission from the Memory block
to one of the two integrated displays. Next, three different
HT devices (Cases 1-3) have been introduced into the original
circuit with the malicious purpose of data leakage. Finally, the
proposed run-time Differential Power Monitoring circuit has
been implemented on the setup.
A. The Original Circuit
The function of the original circuit (Fig. 8, shown by an
orange border) is to store and display data from the built-in
memory block, after a log-in procedure. A keyboard and a
display, linked to the Authentication block, are leveraged to
facilitate the log-in process. Upon a successful log-in event,
an enable signal is generated by the Authentication block.
This signal is fed into the Processing block. The enable signal
triggers the Processing block to fetch the secret data from
the Memory block. Here, the Processing block uses Inter-
Integrated Circuit (I2C) communication protocol to request
from the Memory block. In turn, the Memory block requests
the data from a built in memory device through Serial Pe-
ripheral Interface (SPI). Once the secret data is passed to the
Processing block, it is presented on a second display. The
communication with both displays is executed through I2C
protocol. After a pre-set time, the system automatically clears
the displays and logs out, getting ready for a new log-in cycle.
B. The Hardware Trojan Device
HT Case 1: In this attack scenario the HT has
three components: a 16MHz ATmega328P microcontroller,
an NRF24L01 System-on-Chip 2.4 GHz radio frequency
transceiver and a 5v/3.3v logic level shifter (shown in Fig.
7 and Fig. 8 with a red border). The device has five I/O pins:
two power input and three data wires for timing the attack and
eavesdropping on the interconnections on the original circuit.
Two of the data wires are tapped to the SPI interconnections in
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Fig. 9: The flow chart of Differential Power Monitoring logic steps.
Algorithm 1 Main Power Monitor data flow.
. Step 0
1: Pthr := DetectionThreshold . Set Det . Threshold
2: N := AveragingLevel . Set Averaging level
3: ∆PMovAvg[∆P,N ] := 0 . Initialise moving average
4: Initiate power sensors. . Step 1
5: while 1 do
. Storing data from sensors | Step 2
6: PMPM := sensor[0].GetPower
7: for i = 1, 5 do
8: PsumSPM+ = sensor[i].GetPower
9: end for
. Find new ∆P | Step 3
10: ∆Pnew := PMPM − PsumSPM
. Update the moving average with new ∆P
11: ∆PMovAvg[∆P,N ] := ∆PMovAvg[∆Pnew, N ]
12: if ∆PMovAvg[∆P,N ] > Pthr then . Step 4
13: Hardware Trojan detected.
14: end if
15: end while
the memory block. One of these wires carries a trigger signal,
which turns the HT into an active transmitter, while the second
wire is used to read the secret data. Additionally, a third wire is
linked to the enable signal from the Authentication block. By
default, the HT is set to sleeping mode to minimise the power
consumption to stay undetected, and it only wakes up on a log-
in event. To further increase its stealthiness, it is programmed
to leak data after a certain number of log-in events. When
the HT has reached the data leakage iteration, it powers on
the radio-transmitter, which is otherwise turned off in order
to reduce power consumption and avoid detection. Finally, the
data is leaked out, and the HT device is sent back to sleep.
HT Case 2: To reduce the power consumption, we
now consider an HT device with a 16MHz ATmega328P
microcontroller unit. The HT has two states: 1) a state of
active payload delivery after triggering, and 2) an idle state.
The power consumption of the device in State 1 is around
5mW -10mW , whereas in State 2 it is under 300µW (Power-
Down mode). In Case 2, the payload of the HT is assumed
to be arbitrary. The condition-based activation trigger for the
HT can be either the enabling signal from the PCB circuit
similar to Case 1, or an internal watchdog timer. The HT’s
pin connections are also executed in a similar way to Case 1.
HT Case 3: The always-on HT discussed in Case 3 is
similar to the one in Case 2. A major difference, however, is in
the operating pattern. As opposed to Case 2, here the HT does
not have a triggering condition and is directly set to the only
available active state after power up of the PCB. The power
consumption of the device is in the range of 5mW -10mW .
In Case 3 the payload of the HT is assumed to be arbitrary.
The pin connections of the HT, except for the trigger signal
pin, are executed in a similar way to that in Case 1.
C. The Power Monitoring Circuit
There are two blocks to the power monitoring circuit: (a) a
Main Power Monitor (MPM), and (b) five Sub Power Monitors
(SPM) (Fig. 2, Fig. 7, Fig. 8 marked in green borders). Inside
the MPM, along with the power sensor, an ATmega328P
microcontroller has been used to conduct the on-board data
processing and to deliver the dampening and communication
functions. The microcontroller is linked to all power sensors
via a multiplexer for communication using the I2C protocol.
As illustrated in Fig. 9, after the initial power up (Step 0),
the microcontroller in MPM sets up all the power sensors on
the PCB (Step 1). Next, in Step 2 the MPM requests and
receives power readings from all the sensors at a given time.
Note that within one iteration the time-span between any two
SPM readings is negligible. Then, in Step 3 it processes the
obtained power readings. Finally, it follows from (8) that if
the difference is larger than the pre-set Detection Threshold,
an HT detection alarm is raised and the microcontroller begins
the next iteration (Step 4). These steps are described in more
detail in the form of the pseudocode Algorithm 1.
Power sensing is executed through INA219 high-side cur-
rent and power monitor chips. These chips have a built in
12-bit ADC and provide readings with a resolution of 1mW.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments performed support the theory described in
Section IV. Three sets of experiments have been carried out.
Firstly, as a proof of concept, the hardware prototype has been
tested against three different HT attacks for detection capabil-
ity assessment. Additionally, an HT detectability analysis has
been carried out by dampening the noise level and finding the
corresponding lowest threshold with 0% False Positive Rate
(FPR). An experiment has also been set up to address varying
and complex workload situations, which can induce an abrupt
change in the power consumption of the legitimate board-level
components. The purpose of this experiment is to validate the
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Fig. 10: Spike in ∆PHTinf when HT is triggered, and drop
in
∑n
i=1(PSPM )i alongside the rise of PMPM .
detectability of an HT on the PCB in a scenario where the
legitimate ICs are running with varying workloads.
Secondly, ambient temperature variation experiments have
been conducted to verify the robustness of the Differential
Power Monitoring (DPM) methodology in a range of operating
environments.
Lastly, the third group of experiments involved validation
against process variation, where 5 groups of microcontrollers
have been used to represent die-to-die variation.
A. Proof of Concept and Averaging-Threshold Trade-off
Data obtained from the experiments confirm the capability
of the proposed DPM method to detect the presence of an HT
on the PCB. The power values in Figs. 10-12 and Figs. 14-16,
all functions of time, have been recorded with frequency ν of
the monitoring setup and presented as time series, e.g.
{∆P (t), t = n
ν
, ν = 100Hz, n = 1, 2, 3, ...}. (10)
All experiments presented in this subsection have been carried
out at room temperature (20◦C).
HT Case 1: As illustrated in Fig. 10, there is a clear spike
in ∆PHTinf value, when an HT is triggered. If the value of
this spike is larger than the pre-defined Detection Threshold,
the HT will be detected. Note that as the Detection Threshold
is lowered, lower power HTs become detectable. Two different
Detection Thresholds are illustrated in Fig. 11. Here, level A
provides a better HT detection resolution than level B, since
it is capable of detecting lower ∆PHTinf spikes. However,
by lowering the Detection Threshold from B to A, the False
Positive Rate increases due to the noise on ∆PHTinf values.
Post-processing of the results of the measurements shows
that applying a moving average filter greatly reduces the
impact of noise on the raw ∆PHTinf values (Eq. 4) as
illustrated in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12. As can be seen in both
figures, the ∆P (20)HTinf values produce a smoother signal with
the averaging parameter set at N = 20.
One downside to this averaging technique is the risk of
losing data on HT short-time scale activation, since the data
may be smoothed in the same way as an anomalous peak.
Fig. 11: ∆PHTinf and ∆P
(20)
HTinf during HT triggering.
Fig. 12: Raw ∆PHTinf (top grey graph), and ∆P
(20)
HTinf
(bottom red graph) with an averaging of 20.
This issue can be addressed by introducing a higher frequency
monitoring system, which is fast enough to record data several
times while the HT is active. Ideally the monitoring system
will sample the power readings of the PCB at least N times
while the Trojan is active, where N is the number of data points
used to calculate the moving average. The optimal value of N
can be achieved through experimental means. On the other
hand, the use of an averaging function creates a less noisy
signal. As it can be seen in Fig. 11 the individual values of
a noisy signal (black line) can be notably deviated from their
average shown by the red line. By taking the moving average,
these deviations are mostly alleviated. This allows us to detect
an HT device drawing a lower amount of power. In addition,
the moving average filtering provides significant improvements
to the False Positive Rate (FPR) and the same values of FPR
are reached at notably lower Detection Thresholds (Fig. 13).
As shown in Table I, the minimum Detection Threshold for
0% FPR consistently drops along with the increase of the
averaging level. For example, with the experimental setup
TABLE I: Detection Thresholds for FPR ≈ 0%







Threshold 63 mW 20 mW 3.5 mW 1.9 mW
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Fig. 13: False Positive Rate for 5 levels of averaging of
∆PHTinf at room temperature.
Fig. 14: Detection of a triggered Hardware Trojan; ∆P (20)HTinf
at room temperature.
under test, over thirty-fold reduction of Detection Threshold
has been recorded for an FPR of zero percent, when the
raw ∆PHTinf (63mW ) values are compared to their moving
averages ∆P (50)HTinf (1.9mW ) (Table I).
HT Case 2: In this case, described in Section V, a
conditionally activated HT has been used for the attack. The
results show that with a prior knowledge of the appropriate
Detection Threshold (4mW ) the Hardware Trojan is easily
detectable. As illustrated in Fig. 14 the power consumption
of the activated HT (red line) fluctuates between 6mW and
9mW . It can also be seen by the green line that the ∆P (20)
values from (10) fluctuate around 2mW . The experiment has
been repeated on a batch of 5 PCBs and the worst-case
scenario PCB with the highest value of Detection Threshold
for FPR ≈ 0% has been chosen for illustration.
HT Case 3: In this case, an always-on HT has been used
for the attack. The HT turns on when the PCB is powered on.
As can be seen in Fig. 15, the moving average of the HT’s
power consumption (red line) was around 7.5mW . Shown
in green is the baseline PDN power consumption based on
characterisation of a batch of HT free PCBs. It can be seen
that by using a predefined Detection Threshold of 1mW it is
possible to detect the HT with near 0% FPR. It should be noted
Fig. 15: Detection of an Always-on Hardware Trojan;
∆P
(75)
HTinf at room temperature.
Fig. 16: Detection of a Hardware Trojan under variable
workload of legitimate components.
that if the HT activation time is very long, as in the always-on
case, the averaging level can be set to a high number (e.g.
N = 1000) which will filter the noise down to the order of
tens of µ-Watts. Hence, the HT power Detection Threshold
(7) can be lowered to the same order.
Note that the proposed method uses different moving av-
erage filters to detect HTs with different characteristics (e.g.
power consumption, active time). Depending on the targeted
HT characteristics, one or more moving average filters may
be deployed for optimal HT detection.
Variable Workload of Legitimate ICs: More complex
situations with variable workloads of legitimate on-board
components have been considered in this experiment. The
Differential Power Monitoring method is used to detect the HT
which has been programmed to switch on and off with a given
time period and a consequent switch in power consumption
from 7mW to less than 300µW . As can be seen from Fig. 16,
four legitimate ICs (PSPM1-PSPM4) change their power con-
sumption at different times. This change is also clearly visible
in the overall PCB power consumption (PMPM ). The results
show that the power consumption of the HT (∆PHTinf ) has
been detected. As expected, it has repeatedly exceeded the pre-
defined Detection Threshold despite the changes in the power
consumption of the legitimate ICs.
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Fig. 17: Temperature variation effect on False Positive Rate.
B. Possible Attacks and Countermeasures
To further improve the proposed methodology it is crucial
to understand how it can be circumvented. Two possible
scenarios of an HT attack can be considered.
In the first scenario the adversary targets one of the legit-
imate IC and SPM module pairs. The communication wires
between this victim SPM and the MPM module, as well as
the power source wires of the legitimate IC are cut. Next, an
HT with its dedicated fake SPM module is added under the
same address name. Finally, both the HT and legitimate IC
power are sourced through the fake SPM and it is connected
to the MPM module. Now, whenever the MPM tries to read
the victim SPM, it will actually address the fake SPM. This
way the HT power consumption is added to the overall SPM
measurements and is thus not detected. This attack can be
counteracted by introducing existing HT prevention methods.
For example, using cryptography as described by Z. Guo et
al in [37] for the communication between the MPM and SPM
modules can prevent the attack described above.
In the second scenario the HT is not powered from the
power distribution network. An example of such an attack,
where the HT is powered from an I/O pin of a legitimate
IC, is mentioned in Section II. In this case the extra power
consumption of the HT will be attributed to the legitimate IC
and not contribute to ∆PHTinf . Thus the HT will be invisible
for the proposed monitoring system. Developing an algorithm
based on characterisation of a batch of a given PCB design will
help detect deviations from the expected power consumption
pattern for each legitimate IC. Such deviations will indicate
the presence of an HT device on the PCB. This approach will
also address the first attack scenario discussed above.
C. Temperature Variation
Considering that real-life devices may be utilised in envi-
ronments exhibiting different temperatures, it is necessary to
verify the flexibility of Differential Power Monitoring (DPM)
to adapt to a range of temperatures. To verify the capability
of detecting power-consuming HTs, the developed hardware
prototype has been tested inside a temperature chamber. As a
Fig. 18: ∆P (10)HTinf in 20
◦C and 50◦C ambient temperatures.
Fig. 19: Temperature chamber.
case study this has been done for the attack scenario described
in Case 1 (Section V-B). The results shown in Fig. 17 illustrate
the reported FPRs in a range of temperatures (20◦C, 30◦C and
50◦C).
According to these experimental results, the number of
reported false positives drops significantly at higher ambient
temperatures, with the lowest values in the experiment being
at 50◦C. This effect further strengthens the DPM method.
Further, the experiments have been repeated 5 times at every
temperature and the HT was successfully detected in every
case. A representative view of ∆P (10)HTinf values (including the
HT’s power consumption spikes) at 20◦C and 50◦C is given
in Fig. 18. When comparing the results, it can be seen that no
notable change was recorded in the peak values of ∆P (10)HTinf .
Based on this evidence, the chances of detecting an HT device
on the PCBs are higher at higher ambient temperatures.
The equipment used to conduct the experiments is a Gal-
lenkamp hot box oven with a fan, model OV-165 with an error
margin of +/- 1.5◦ Celsius (Fig. 19).
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Fig. 20: Process variation effect on False Positive Rate for
microcontroller groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 at room temperature.
D. Process Variation
In recent semiconductor devices (< 90nm) the effect
of process variation cannot be ignored. Fabrication process
variation is mainly due to sub-wavelength lithography, random
dopant distribution, line edge roughness and stress engineering
[46], [47]. It has been shown that more than 30% difference
in the drive current of a transistor is observed on a 65-nm
device due to process variation, when compared to the nominal
operating condition [47]. Process variation has negative effect
on the quality of manufacturing test as well, leading to test
escapes [48]. It can be further categorised into Intra-die (die-
to-die) and Inter-die (within die) variation. The experiments
conducted in this research address die-to-die process variation.
The proposed DPM method requires knowledge of the
power consumption patterns of the PCB in order to determine
the optimal Detection Threshold, therefore, a characterisation
stage of a PCB batch is required. To account for process
variation effects across the batch, the same experiment has
been conducted with five groups of microcontrollers (Group
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), five times each. As a case study this has been
done for the attack scenario described in Case 1 (Section V-B).
The Main Power Monitor (MPM), Authentication, Processing
and Memory blocks in the original circuit as well as the HT
(Fig. 7) were swapped with a new set of chips and observed
for detection of any changes in the functionality of the power
monitoring block. With the averaging parameter set at N = 10
(∆P (10)HTinf ), the experimental results, illustrated in Fig. 20,
show large variations of FPR at lower Detection Thresholds.
However, the FPR registered a sharp fall at higher Detection
Thresholds (> 5mW ). Even in the worst-case scenario (Group
5) the FPR was below 1% at the Detection Threshold of 5mW.
With the Detection Threshold set at 13mW, the FPR was zero
in all five cases. All experiments explained in this subsection
have been carried out at room temperature (20◦C).
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The detectability of HTs can be affected by issues that are
beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Detectable HT Payload Delivery Time and Power
The recording frequency of the DPM monitoring setup in
our prototype is around ν = 100Hz. This sets the threshold of
the minimum detectable activation period of an HT at about
10ms. HTs with longer activation periods will be recorded,
as long as the overall power consumed by the HT is higher
than the Detection Threshold. Note that the power sensors
used in our prototype are limited to a relatively slow I2C (up
to 2.56 Mbps High-speed mode) communication protocol.
The results can be significantly improved by leveraging faster
communication protocols.
It is clear that even lower power HTs can be detected by
changing the monitoring equipment and introducing higher
frequency and more accurate sensors with better resolution and
precision. For example, using INA226 digital power senors
with a resolution of 10µW (ADC 16bits) will decrease the
lower limit of Detection Threshold 100 times compared to the
prototype discussed in this paper.
B. Statistical Analysis and Theoretical Underpinning
The detectability of HTs is also affected by issues including
the RC characteristics of the PCBs’ wires, and workload
dependent drift in the parasitic power consumption of the
PCB’s power distribution network. Even in a noise-free en-
vironment, and assuming ideal precision and speed of power
sensors, these effects provide a window of opportunity for
the adversary to implant a very small HT device and avoid
detection. The theoretical underpinning with statistical analysis
of the proposed work will be considered in our future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper is the first to develop a methodology on detecting
Hardware Trojan (HT) components on a Printed Circuit Board
(PCB) using power monitoring. The methodology proposed
here is independent of the HT’s trigger and payload functions.
The presented results show that the proposed Differential
Power Monitoring (DPM) method, based on power consump-
tion, can detect HT devices implanted on the PCB, with a false
positive rate (FPR) that can become zero by selecting appropri-
ate Detection Threshold (Table I). Considering the diversity of
operating conditions in real life scenarios, the DPM has been
validated in a temperature chamber for temperature variation.
In addition, process variation factor has also been considered,
which plays a crucial role in sub-90nm technologies. In
particular, five different groups of microcontrollers have been
employed to extract hard-silicon process variation data.
The Differential Power Monitoring (DPM) technique pro-
vides additional protection for end users without affecting the
throughput of the PCB. It can be employed in conjunction with
other PCB HT countermeasures without cross-disruption. Key
variables in the DPM technique that can be improved upon are
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sensor frequency, resolution and accuracy, and the averaging
level for ∆PHTinf . The proposed methodology can be further
improved by using more sophisticated sensors, communica-
tion protocols and carrying out theoretical underpinning as
described in Section VII. This along with other improvements
will be considered in our future work.
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